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RECONCILING QUASI-STATES WITH THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION UNDER THE ICC STATUTE
Sascha Dominik Bachmann*
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ABSTRACT
On June 11, 2010, a binding definition of the crime of aggression was finally
adopted at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute in Kampala, Uganda.
The adopted definition of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute reflecting
on existing practice leads to the assumption that State-like entities which are
lacking universal recognition will not be covered by the Court’s jurisdiction of
the crime of aggression. The fact that the term ‘State’ was not clearly defined
under the Rome Statute gives the first indication of the implied exclusion of
State-like entities from the scope of the crime of aggression. On the other hand,
the most recent interpretation of the term “State” as provided by the
International Criminal Court (ICC) delivers even more persuasive evidence,
reinforcing the argument that these entities would not be covered by this
amendment. This Article argues that uncertainty or explicit exclusion of these
entities are both illegitimate; based on historical, legal and practical analyses
respectively. Consequently, for the purpose of amending this illegitimate
situation, the Article will examine how to reconcile these entities with the
definition of the crime of aggression. It acknowledges that the explicit inclusion
of such entities under the definition alongside States, yet, distinguishable from
the latter, is the most favorable solution that better serves the wider objectives
of international criminal justice and law.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was
adopted at the Rome conference,1 and the crime of aggression was included
amongst the four international core crimes within its jurisdiction.2 However,
since a definition of the crime could not be agreed on then, the new ICC was not
able to prosecute the crime of aggression when it became operational in 2002. It
took until 2010, when after extensive discussions by the members of the
Assembly of States Parties, the crime of aggression was finally defined as:
The planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or
military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its
character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the
Charter of the United Nations.3

This definition of the crime of aggression, as adopted by the ICC, is
influenced by the definition of the act of aggression articulated in the U.N.
General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 3314, which always exclusively
addressed interstate aggression as international wars.4 Likewise, the crime of
aggression limited its scope of application in terms of criminal responsibility to
state leaders only.5
The issue of determining the aggressor has concerned policy makers,
scholars, diplomats and Statesmen for over a quarter of a century. Today, this
question is still being debated among scholars and policy makers, and it is almost
unanimous that attaining this objective is extremely difficult.6 The ICC is
restricted in its jurisdiction over aggression to state leaders only and does not
provide a clear definition of what is to be considered a state. The only relevant
stipulation of a state would be the definition used in the just mentioned UNGA
Resolution 3314 which was used as source for outlining the crime of aggression,
1
U.N. GAOR, Final Act of the U.N. Dipl. Conf. of Plenipotentiarieson the Est. of an Intl. Crim. Ct.,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (July 17, 1998).
2
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 4, ¶ 4, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
3
International Criminal Court Assembly of States Parties Res. RC/Res.6, annex I (June 11, 2010)
[hereinafter A.S.P. Res. RC/Res.6].
4
A.S.P. Res. RC/Res.6, supra note 3, annex I, art. 8 bis, ¶ 2.
5
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 9, 18–19 (International Criminal Court
2011) (2002) (Articles 8 bis and 25(3) bis apply to as “a person in a position effectively to exercise control over
or to direct the political or military action of a State . . . .”).
6
Memorandum submitted by Mr. Ricardo J. Alfaro on Question of Defining Aggression to the Int’l Law
Comm’n, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.8 (May 30, 1951) (“Referring to the work of the Committee on Arbitration in
1924, Mr. Adatci asserted: “The most difficult and most delicate task was that of defining the aggressor.”).
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whereas “in this Definition the term ‘State’: (a) is used without prejudice to
questions of recognition or to whether a State is a member of the United
Nations.”7
The issue of this ambiguity stems from different contexts. Historically, these
entities could be treated as States for the purpose of the act of aggression, and
from a legal point of view, they could also be described as such and incur
international responsibility especially in the area of armed conflicts. In modern
times, Quasi-States have become a major actor in war and conflict.8 However,
since they are granted some but not all rights and obligations under international
law, they cannot be described as fully-fledged states. Thus, Quasi-States have
attained statehood to a certain extent, yet, they are not regarded as states due to
the lack of universal recognition. The specific rights and obligations of QuasiStates include their compliance with the law applicable to armed conflicts,
namely the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.
Conflicts involving Quasi-States are strictly speaking not international, as
the international community does not recognise these entities as states. Nor are
such conflicts “purely internal,” since Quasi-States are “separate, effective[ly]
state-like [entities] having some level of international personality” against
recognised states.9 Hence, they are best described as Quasi International Armed
Conflicts (QIACs),10 such as the Sri Lankan civil war.11 Therefore, referring to
such hybrid interstate/internal armed conflicts without clear state definition
questions the applicability of the crime of aggression on such conflicts.
Currently, Quasi-States such as Somaliland, Western Sahara, Abkhazia,
Transnistria, South Ossetia, Kosovo (which has become recognized under state
custom since 2008), Palestine and finally the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (IS)
(until its collapse in 2017) exist on nearly every continent. They usually emerge
through military means in the form of civil wars. The number of armed conflicts
involving Quasi-States exceeds by far the number of (classical) interstate armed
conflicts.12 Thus, it is necessary from a practical point of view to clear the

7

G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Definition of Aggression, Annex I, art. 1 (Dec. 14, 1974).
Alexander G. Wills, The Crime of Aggression and the Resort to Force against Entities in Statu
Nascendi, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 83, 86–87 (2012) (as recent examples of armed conflicts involving QuasiStates, Wills mentions the Sri Lankan Civil War, the second Sudanese Civil War South Ossetian War and certain
stages of the Yugoslav Wars).
9
Id. at 86.
10
Id.
11
Id.; see Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, In Pursuit of a Mythical State of Tamil Eelam: A Rejoinder to
Kristian Stokke, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 1185 (2007).
12
See Wills, supra note 8, at 83–84; see also Rep. of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (2004) [hereinafter Rep. of the Rep. of the High-Level Panel].
8
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ambiguity surrounding the legal position of Quasi-States, in order to overcome
current challenges and attain a higher level of international peace.
This Article aims to reconcile Quasi-States with the crime of aggression
under the Rome Statute and discusses their position under international law. It
is argued that, based on historical, practical and legal considerations, QuasiStates should be included under the crime of aggression and this Article
elaborates on how to reconcile Quasi-States with the crime of aggression.
Following the introduction, part I will provide an evaluative overview of the
historical evolution of the Crime of Aggression with a reflection on the historical
meaning of ‘State’. Part II discusses the concept of so called ‘Quasi-States’
under international law before turning to the interpretation of such entities by
the ICC. Part III examines the ICC’s interpretation of statehood and its stance
towards ‘Quasi States’. The last part, part IV reflects on the interpretative issues
around the term ‘State’ before the current sociological changes to warfare. This
Article concludes with the recommendation that the Rome Statute was to be
amended to include ‘Quasi-States’.
I.

THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION

Beginning from the Nuremberg to the Rome Statute, the historical evolution
of the crime of aggression will confirm that the definition in the Rome Statute is
reflection of customary international law, and constitutes the consensus of the
international community on the concept of aggression. Accordingly, redefining
aggression is not a promising venue.13
A. The Nuremberg Trials and the Subsequent Efforts to Define Aggression.
In mid-1943, the idea of individual criminal responsibility for aggression
began to take shape, when criminologist Aron Naumovich Trainin put forward
in his book, Defence of Peace and Criminal Law, the proposition that individuals
should be held accountable for initiating aggressive war.14 His ideas inspired one
of the major legal principles adopted by the Nuremberg and Tokyo International
Military Tribunals (IMT): “‘crimes against peace’ through ‘common plan or
conspiracy’.”15

13
Benjamin B. Ferencz, Ending Impunity for the Crime of Aggression, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 281,
285 (2009); Hyeyoung Lee, The Applicability of the Crime of Aggression to Armed Conflicts Involving QuasiStates (2014) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Indiana University Maurer School of Law).
14
KIRSTEN SELLARS, CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (2013).
15
Id. at 49–50.
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At that point, the discussions that preceded the establishment of the
Nuremberg Tribunals by virtue of its London Charter revealed that the inclusion
of the “crimes against peace”—later to become the crime of aggression—under
international law would not be widely encouraged.16 As it had been agreed to
give the Nuremberg IMT jurisdiction over such a crime,17 the same approach
was followed by the Tokyo IMT as Nuremberg’s equivalent to the Far East.18
The London Charter defined crimes against peace as the “planning, preparation,
initiation, or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements, or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”19
Since at this point in time no one had ever been charged with this crime,
there was heated controversy around the legality of prosecuting such a crime as
“new law.” The Tribunal was faced with the objection of the accused that by
applying crimes against peace, it was implementing the law ex-post facto20 and
as such, violating the non-retroactivity principle under international law.21
In this regard, the Tribunal referred to the aforementioned Kellogg-Briand
Pact (Pact),22 as foundation to emphasise that the waging of war in the late 1930s
was a crime under international law.23

16
Id. at 50; cf. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 159–63 (1963)
(“Some jurists and publicists asserted that it would be compatible with international law to hold a trial of
government leaders responsible for launching the aggressive wars,” however, “some of those who examined the
problem concluded that aggressive war was not criminal according to existing law.”), Sascha Dominik
Bachmann, The Legacy of the Nuremberg Trials – 60 Years on, 2007 J. S. ARF. L. 532, 541–43 (2007) (“This
argument finds support in the findings of the sub-committee of the legal committee of the United Nations war
crimes commission in its majority report of 1945 whereby ‘acts committed by individuals merely for the purpose
of preparing and launching aggressive war, are lege lata, not war crimes.”).
17
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and
Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6 (a), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Strat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279
[hereinafter London Agreement].
18
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, art. 5, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589 [hereinafter
Tokyo Charter].
19
London Agreement, supra note 17, art. 6 (a).
20
See ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
263 (2007); Sascha-Dominik Bachmann & Gerhard Kemp, Aggression as Organized Hypocrisy - How the War
on Terrorism and Hybrid Threats Challenge the Nuremberg Legacy, 30 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 235, 243–
44 (2012). See generally Bachmann supra note 16, at 532–50 (on the Nuremberg Trials’ legacy and its
contemporary criticism).
21
Leo Gross, The Criminality of Aggressive War, 41 AM POL. SCI. ASS’N 205, 205–06 (1947); Bachmann,
supra note 16, at 543.
22
Gross supra note 21, at 217–18.
23
TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL,
NUREMBERG 218 (1947), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf.
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In the opinion of the Tribunal, the solemn renunciation of war as an
instrument of national policy necessarily involves the proposition that
such a war is illegal in international law; and that those who plan and
wage such a war, with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are
committing a crime in so doing.24

German and other critics argue that the ratification of a pact forbidding a state
from waging a war under international law could not lead to individual criminal
responsibility being established “by a so-called ‘Agreement’” among victors in
disregard of a state’s sovereignty and international law.25 This view was based
on the fact that the wording of the Pact, as well as its travaux preparatoires, did
not address in any way the individual criminal liability for violating the States’
obligation to resolve conflicts peacefully.26
Soon after that judgment, the newly established United Nations swiftly
adopted The Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal.27 Additionally, the UNGA requested the International Law
Commission (ILC) to set a “Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind.”28 Today, the crime of aggression is not a novel crime only introduced
by the ICC but a crime under international law for nearly a century (with the
raised objections noted). Within the ILC, there was an extensive debate
regarding who could be a victim of aggression or an aggressor.29 At this stage,
it was suggested that States and governments could both be aggressors and
victims of aggression.30 In 1954, the final draft failed to be adopted due to
disagreement on varied issues such as the specification of armed force and
regulation of indirect aggression,31 although it was also unclear to what extent

24

Id. at 445.
Id.; Bachmann & Kemp, supra note 20, at 243 (highlighting the state liability/tort character of
Germany’s “aggression”); see also Bachmann, supra note 16, at 542–43; cf. Sascha-Dominik Bachmann,
Today’s Quest for International Criminal Justice – A Short Overview of the Present State of Criminal
Prosecution of International Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 298, 298 (Noëlle Qunivet & Shilan Shah-Davis, eds., T.M.C. ASSER PRESS, 2010).
26
Gross supra note 21, at 209–10.
27
G.A. Res. 95 (I), Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal (Dec. 10, 1946) [hereinafter U.N.G.A. 1946].
28
U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 308th plen. mtg. at 378 (V) B, Duties of States in the event of the outbreak of
hostilities (Nov. 17, 1950); see also Draft Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, U.N. Doc A/C.1/608
(Nov. 4, 1950).
29
Summary Record of the 95th Meeting, [1951] 1 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 107, 108–16, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR 95.
30
See id. ¶ 5.
31
See M. Cherif Bassioun et al., Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 80
PROC. OF THE ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC. INT’L L.) 120, 120 (1986).
25
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the introduction of the concept of governments as victims of aggression could
have affected the final decision.
In 1968, the matter was raised again and the term “political entities” was
introduced to cover aggressions from and against entities that were not
recognized or whose statehood was controversial in some other way.32
Following a prolonged debate, the Working Group of the Special Committee
finally established that “the definition itself should refer to States only and not
to political entities as referred to in the Six-Power draft.”33 The situation
remained unchanged until 1974 when “aggression” was finally defined by
UNGA Resolution 331434 and recommended to the Security Council for
guidance. The accord was built around a wide definition: “Aggression is the use
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Charter
of the U.N.”35 In an explanatory note, the resolution added that the term “‘State’
. . . is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is
a member of the United Nations.”36 Nonetheless, the resolution did not provide
a customary law definition for individual crimes of aggression; it only offered a
mere distinction between a “war of aggression” and an “act of aggression,” with
any such act raising international State responsibility as a consequence.37 The
jus ad bellum had finally become a jus contra bellum, and this illegality of
waging (unjustified) war had become a potential liability issue for the
perpetrating state and state leader alike.38
B. The Crime of Aggression in the Rome Statute—Background
It is worth mentioning that since the Nuremberg Trials, the crime of waging
a war of aggression has remained non-prosecutable until the adoption of the new
definition in the ICC Statute and its entry into force in 2018.39 This becomes
clear when looking at the jurisdiction of recent and contemporary international
criminal tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunal for the former

32

Wills, supra note 8, at 98.
U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Rep. of the Special Comm. On the Question of Defining Aggression, annex
III, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/8419 (1971).
34
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 7.
35
Id. art.1.
36
Id. annex, art.1.
37
See id. annex, arts. 2–3, 5, ¶ 2.
38
Id. art.5, ¶ 2.
39
See Assemb. of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Ct., 16th Sess., U.N. Doc. ICCASP/16/L.10 (Dec. 14, 2017).
33
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Yugoslavia (ICTY)40 and its “judicial twin” the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR),41 as both do not proscribe aggression and accordingly do
not establish individual criminal responsibility. Similarly, the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (SCSL)42 as a hybrid court of international and domestic criminal
jurisdiction, in addition to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (ECCC),43 did not prosecute aggression either. The only stipulation
about the crime of aggression could be found in the Statute of the Iraqi High
Tribunal (IHT),44 which, although it was not an international tribunal,
considered this as a domestic Iraqi crime and not an international crime.45
Thus, advocates of the crime of aggression were concerned about the
persistent lack of prosecution against that crime.46 Subsequent to lengthy
discussions, the crime of aggression was added to the jurisdiction of the ICC,
but was not given effect until the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute
(ASP) defined the crime and the jurisdictional requirements for the Court to
exercise its jurisdiction.47 In 1998, Resolution F of the Final Act of the Rome
Conference48 called for the Preparatory Commission to prepare proposals for a
provision on aggression to be presented to the ASP at a Review Conference.49
For this purpose, the ASP created a Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression (SWGCA) in 2002.50 In turn, the SWGCA developed a definition,
which exceptionally obtained consensuses not only from States Parties but also
40
S.C. Res. 827, art. 1, Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
Since 1991 (July 17, 1993).
41
S.C. Res. 995, art. 2, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Nov. 9, 1994); cf.
Bachmann supra note 25, at 301.
42
S.C. Res. 1315, art. 1, Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone (Aug. 14, 2000) [hereinafter SCSL
Statute].
43
Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution
of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Cambodia-U.N., Oct. 27, 2004,
NS/RKM/1004/006 [hereinafter ECCC Statute].
44
Mark A Drumbl, The Push to Criminalize Aggression: Something Lost Amid the Gains?, 41 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 291, 298 (2009) (quoting Law of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal No. 10 of 2005).
Originally established as Iraqi Special Tribunal by the U.S.-led Provisional Authority in Iraq in 2003, this court
was abolished in October 2005 by Iraq’s new government and re-established as the Supreme Iraqi Criminal
Court. See Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, The Quest for International Criminal Justice – The long road ahead,
2007 J. S. AFR. L. 716, 717 (2007).
45
Id.
46
Id. at 292.
47
Lee, supra note 13, Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5.
48
U.N. GAOR, Final Act of the U.N. Dipl. Conf. of Plenipotentiarieson the Est. of an Intl. Crim. Ct.,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (July 17, 1998).
49
Id. annex. I.
50
Benjamin B. Ferencz, Ending Impunity for the Crime of Aggression, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 281,
282 (2009).
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non-Party States.51 Furthermore, the question of the applicability of the crime of
aggression to territorial entities lacking statehood was also addressed within the
SWGCA.52 Specifically, in the sixth meeting of the SWGCA in 2009, “the view
was expressed that the reference to ‘another State’ [of the crime of aggression]
might inadvertently omit acts committed against a territory that falls short of
statehood, and that therefore, the word ‘State’ in that paragraph should be given
a broad interpretation.”53
Finally, in June 2010, an amendment to the Rome Statute was agreed upon
by the States Parties to the Kampala Conference.54 This amendment was
designed to trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC over the “crime of aggression.”55
In theory, the Court could have begun hearing cases against individuals for
aggression after 2017.56 In December 2017, the Assembly of States Parties
decided to activate the ICC’s “jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as of 17
July 2018.”57 The consensus that had emerged favored a narrow definition with
three major characteristics: “(1) that state action is central to the crime; (2) that
acts of aggression involve interstate armed conflict; and (3) that criminal
responsibility attaches only to very top political or military leaders.”58
In addition, there have been discussions within the SWGCA about whether
generic or specific approaches should be pursued.59 Article 8bis(2) clearly
presents aggression narrowly as involving international war that violates jus ad
bellum.60 In this sense, Article 8bis(2) appears as purely State-centric. Hence,
the SWGCA approach is quite conservative.61 The reason behind it is that such
conservatism “offers an easier path to consensus.”62 Moreover, Theodor Meron
underscored in the United States’ statement regarding the crime of aggression
that:

51

Noah Weisbord, Conceptualizing Aggression, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 27 (2009).
Assemb. of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Ct., Rep. of the Special Working Group
on the Crime of Agg., U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/7/20/Add.1, annex II, ¶ 16 (2009) [hereinafter SWGCA].
53
Id. annex II, ¶ 16.
54
A.S.P. Res. RC/Res. 6, supra note 3.
55
Id. arts. 15bis, 15ter.
56
Id. art. 15bis, ¶ 3.
57
Id. art.15bis, ¶ 3; see Assemb. of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Ct., 16th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/16/L.10 (Dec. 14, 2017).
58
Mark A Drumbl, The Push to Criminalize Aggression: Something Lost Amid the Gains?, 41 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 291, 291 (2009).
59
Assemb. of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Ct., Rep. of the Special Working Group
on the Crime of Agg. on Its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1 (Sep. 5, 2006).
60
Drumbl, supra note 58, at 305.
61
Id.
62
Id.
52
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[P]rudence displayed in Rome has proven wise. . . . [O]ne of the
reasons why the list of crimes in the Statute of the ICC has attained
such credibility and why that list has had such a significant impact on
national legislations is exactly because of the high level of comfort that
the general conformity of Articles 7-8 [n.b. has] with customary
law . . .” And “[u]nder customary law is it only aggressive war that
founds individual criminal responsibility.63

In addition, the historical evolution of the act of aggression itself has always
been state-centric.64 Ann V.W Thomas and A.J ThomasJr, two legal scholars
commenting on the negotiations in the run-up to the 1974 definition of
aggression elaborated that, “‘[s]ince the State has been the prime recipient of
rights and duties at international law, it is the sovereign State which is usually
regarded as the aggressor or the one against whom aggression is committed.’”65
In that sense, codifying the law beyond the boundaries of custom may be
controversial and may question the ICC’s legitimacy, at least in the short term.66
Finally, succeeding in defining aggression, even narrowly, is a great
achievement per se, allowing it to be recognized as part of international legal
practice and for a spirted stand to be taken against the horrors of unauthorized
war-making.67
C. Evaluation of the Historical Development of the Crime of Aggression
As outlined above, it has become clear that the inclusion of the crime of
aggression under the Rome Statute is a reflection of international customary law.
However, unlike the 2010 ICC amendment on the crime of aggression, the
Nuremberg Statute’s definition of the “crime against peace” did not mention the
term “State.”68 Thus, State-centrism under the current definition of the crime of

63
Id. at 305–06 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Crime of Aggression:
Statement by the United States (Theodor Meron) (Dec. 6, 2000)); see also ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 273 (2007).
64
Summary Records of the Ninety-Fifth Meeting, [1951] 1 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 107, 108, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR 95 [hereinafter ILC Yearbook I]; U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supplement 20, at 25–26, U.N. Doc.
A/7620 [hereinafter UNGA Twenty Fourth Session]. But cf. Special Comm. on the Question of Def. Agg., Rep.
of the Sixth Comm., U.N. Doc. A/7402, ¶ 20 (Dec. 13, 1968) [hereinafter UNGA Twenty Third Session] (noting
that “some representatives considered that the definition should be expressly applicable to entities which were
not generally recognized as States . . . .”).
65
Weisbord, supra note 51, at 27 (quoting ANN V.W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE CONCEPT OF
AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (1972)).
66
Drumbl, supra note 58, at 306.
67
2 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE
566 (1975).
68
Steve Beytenbrod, Comment, Defining Aggression: An Opportunity to Curtail the Criminal Activities
of Non-State Actors, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 647, 676 (2011).
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aggression is questioned. Further, as the U.N. embraced the “principles of the
international law recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the
judgment of the Tribunal” in 1946,69 this highlights that all States Parties to the
U.N. at that time had not only accepted the definition provided by the
Nuremberg IMT, but also agreed to its interpretation as given by the Tribunal.
On another note, the influence of the U.N.’s definition of aggression on the
2010 Kampala Conference is highly evident.70 Tracing back the evolution of
U.N. Resolution 3314 reveals that consensus was built around a generic
definition71 that was derived from Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter,72 which
formulates an integral part of customary international law.73 However, the
wording of Resolution 3314 was slightly different from that of Article 2(4). For
instance, unlike the Charter, the Resolution used the term “armed” instead of the
term “force.” Understandably, this modification intends to narrow the scope of
aggression to exclude instances in which force is used without resorting to
arms.74
Later, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that Article 3 (g) of
Resolution 3314—the “sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State”—had become part of customary international law.75 Accordingly,
some might argue that this dictum may serve as an indication that the other
portions of Articles 1 and 3 in Resolution 3314 may correspondingly constitute
customary international law.76
Furthermore, this definition represents the consensus of the wider
international community, as the SWGCA meetings were attended by both States
and non-States parties alike. Therefore, the chosen definition of the Special
Working Group, which was then followed by the ICC, “triggers opportunity
costs.”77 This solution effectively represents the “least common denominator
approach” which “underlines only the consensus that all State-parties agreed
69

Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5.
Beytenbrod, supra note 68, at 676, 679.
71
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) supra note 7, art. 1.
72
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
73
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
14, ¶ 188 (June 27, 1986).
74
Michael J. Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 71, 96 (2010).
75
OSCAR SOLERA, DEFINING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 129 (2008).
76
Id.
77
Drumbl, supra note 44, at 310.
70
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upon.”78 Drumbl concludes that while “there is considerable merit in getting a
core definition in place, there are also numerous reasons for looking beyond
it.”79
Namely, throughout the historical debate over defining aggression, the issue
of the applicability of the crime upon unrecognised entities was always raised;80
and there was a wide consensus regarding the applicability of the crime on such
entities.81 However, the disagreement was on the express inclusion of such
entities under the definition of the crime.82 Accordingly, Resolution 3314
articulated that the term “State” is used without prejudice to questions of
recognition or to whether a State is a member of the U.N.,83 unlike the newly
adopted definition of the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute which is
silent on the issue.84
The examination of the historical development of the crime of aggression
has made it clear that its inclusion in the ICC Statute reflects international
customary law. The idea of including unrecognised entities under the definition
of aggression was widely accepted until it was finally adopted under Resolution
3314. Accordingly, the idea of including Quasi-States under the definition of the
crime of aggression falls within the ambit of international customary law and
State-practice.
1. The Historical Meaning of “State” Under the Developed Concept of
Aggression
In the aftermath of the First World War, there were numerous efforts to
define aggression. The international community realized the paramount
importance of regulating the use of armed forces in international relations.
Accordingly, States attempted to establish standards concerning the lawful
recourse to war.85 They commenced by issuing the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

1930’s).

Id. at 310–11.
Id.
SOLERA, supra note 75.
Id. (providing a general discussion on the subject of including non-state entitites).
Id.
G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 7, annex art. 1.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8bis.
See generally 2 FERENCZ, supra note 67 (describing the efforts to define aggression in the 1920’s and
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which established a general prohibition on the use of armed force.86 However,
the Pact did not offer a definition on aggression.87
Later, at the 1933 World Disarmament Conference, the Soviet delegation
demanded the creation of a universal definition of aggression and put forward a
draft definition.88 The definition included the declaration of war against another
State as an act of aggression.89 During these deliberations, the argument that a
concerned State lacks “certain attributes of State organization” was frequently
used as a justification for armed attacks.90 It is not obvious what the clause
“certain attributes of State organization” means. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
concept of “State” in the Soviet sense did not require the strict fulfilment of the
criteria of statehood.
After the Second World War, regulating the use of armed force was
approached through three different but related processes. The first was the total
prohibition of the illegal use of armed force between States, which was included
in the U.N. Charter in Article 2(4).91 The second was to agree on a definition to
guide the Security Council to ascertain whether certain acts constitute
aggression.92 The last was to end impunity and punish those individuals in
charge of committing international crimes, which was swiftly realized by the
international military tribunals.93 Beginning with the U.N. Charter, although the
drafting of the Charter limited perpetrators to States, the U.N. practice proved to
include Quasi-States. North Korea, which at the time was not recognized as a
State by the U.N., was held responsible for acts contrary to its terms.
Moreover, the U.N. position showed that unrecognized States could be
parties to acts of aggression. For instance, “in 1948 the Arab States sent military
forces into Palestine but elected to regard the ‘State’ of Israel as a rebellious
minority in an independent nation which had requested the assistance of the Arab
states in restoring law and order.”94 In reaction to the Arab States’ contention,

86

SOLERA, supra note 75, at 32.
See Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat.
2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 59.
88
2 FERENCZ, supra note 67, at 201.
89
Id. at 202.
90
Id. at 203.
91
SOLERA, supra note 75, at 38; Glennon, supra note 74, at 77.
92
Benjamin B. Ferencz, Defining Aggression: Where It Stands and Where It’s Going, 66 AM. J. INT’L L.
491, 493.
93
Glennon, supra note 74, at 74–75.
94
D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 153 (1958).
87
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the majority of the Council members “disregarded the question of statehood and
concentrated on the fact of invasion by states of territory not their own.” 95
The Security Council took the same view when with the attacks on Indonesia
by the Netherlands in 1947.96 The Security Council in these instances suggests
that, “the U.N. organ will not interpret statehood too literally and limit the
obligation of Art. 2(4) to cases of attack against a recognized state; more
particularly, they will not allow the attacker, by withholding recognition from
its victim, to evade the prohibition.”97
2. The International Law Commission and the Debates on Who Can Be an
Aggressor or Victim
Upon its establishment, the UNGA was handed the task of defining
aggression.98 Even at this early stage, disputes along the Yugoslavian border,
blockades put in place by Eastern European socialist countries, and U.S.
intervention in the Korean War were more than enough to convince the Soviet
Union of the need to submit a new draft definition of aggression to the First
Committee. The Soviet Union in its submission emphasized that “[a]ttacks . . .
may not be justified . . . by the affirmation that the State attacked lacks the
distinguishing marks of statehood.”99
This proposal was hard to adopt because of the lack of consensus on the way
of defining aggression.100 Accordingly, the matter was assigned to the ILC.101
Within the ILC many proposals were submitted, one of which was the proposal
of the Panamanian politician and delegate to the U.N., Mr. Ricardo Alfaro.
Alfaro defined aggression along these lines:
Aggression is the use of force by one State or group of States, or by
any Government or group of Governments, against the territory and
people of other States or Governments, in any manner, by any
methods, for any reasons and for any purposes, except individual or
collective self-defence against armed attack or coercive action by the
United Nations.102

95

Glennon, supra note 74, at 74–75.
Id. at 150, 153.
97
Id. at 153–54.
98
Lee supra note 13; SOLERA, supra note 75, at 79.
99
Id. at 2.
100
SOLERA, supra note 75, at 88.
101
Lee, supra note 13.
102
Memorandum submitted by Mr. Ricardo J. Alfaro, ¶ 36, Intl’ Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.8
(May 30, 1950), reprinted in [1951] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 37, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add.1
96
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Alfaro’s memorandum demonstrates that the intention behind including the term
“government” is to cover non-State entities that commit the crime of
aggression:103
The term of “by one State or group of States, or by any Government
or group of Governments” is used in order to avoid any interpretation
in the sense that only States can commit aggression and are capable of
disturbing the peace of the world. There may be governments of
nations or people not organized or recognized as States, which may
have at their disposal the armies, weapons and other means of
committing aggression. “(emphasis added)”104

Alfaro’s definition might have been influenced by the Korean War given that
North Korea had not yet achieved statehood, at least in the eyes of the U.N.105
Despite the disagreement on the statehood of North Korea, the UNGA
nonetheless deemed that the attack against South Korea was clearly an act of
aggression.106 The perception that the definition of aggression should include
hostilities by North Korea, even if it was not a state, was approved by other
participants.107
Mr. Cordova, the Vice Chairman of the ILC at the time, provided that “the
words ‘the authorities of a State’…or their equivalent were essential, if
aggression such as that committed by North Korea, which was not a State, was
to be made punishable.”108 The ILC representative from Brazil, Mr. Amado, and
member of the International Law Commission stated “he had avoided using the
word “State” so as not to limit its application to states alone.”109 The formulation
“by a State or a Government” was at last adopted without any objection.110

103

Lee, supra note 13.
Memorandum submitted by Mr. Ricardo J. Alfaro, supra note 101,¶ 46.
105
Lee, supra note 13; G.A. Res. 46/1 (Sept. 17, 1991) (deciding to admit the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea to membership in the U.N.).
106
Lee, supra note 13; G.A. Res. 498 (V), ¶ 1 (Feb. 1, 1951) (“Finds that the Central People’s Government
of the People’s Republic of China by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing
aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, had itself engaged in
aggression in Korea.”).
107
Lee, supra note 13.
108
Summary Records of the 95th Meeting, [1951] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 111, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1951 [hereinafter Summary Records of the 98th Meeting].
109
Id. ¶ 60.
110
Lee, supra note 13; Summary Records of the 98th Meeting, supra note 108, ¶¶ 52–53, 64.
104
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II. THE CONCEPT OF QUASI-STATES
As mentioned above, the Kampala amendments presented a significant
contribution to international criminal law, although not without fault. If the
primary objectives of this amendment were to attain higher levels of
international peace and security and enhance the efficiency of the international
criminal justice system, then they were not duly fulfilled. This is due to the
restriction of the definition of the crime to inter-State armed conflicts without
properly interpreting what constitutes a State, or a clear guarantee that QuasiStates can be treated as States under the crime of aggression.
Therefore, there is clear uncertainty regarding the concept of Quasi-States
and whether they fall within the remit of the crime of aggression. Since QuasiStates possess the required criteria for statehood but lack universal recognition,
there are doubts surrounding their status under international law. However, as
concluded from the historical discussion, there was always a wide consensus on
the inclusion of such entities under the definition of aggression, either explicitly
or impliedly. Quasi-States are involved in many modern armed conflicts;111 it is
hence crucial for the realization of international peace to reach a conclusion
regarding the applicability of the crime of aggression upon these entities.
Consequently, this part will attempt to demarcate the concept of Quasi-States
and prove that they can be considered as States since the elements that these
Quasi-States are lacking do not prevent them from being described as States.
Moreover, clarifying the concept of Quasi-States will assist in finding and
examining the best possible solution for applying existing prohibitions against
aggression to these particular entities.
A. General Characteristics of Quasi-States
Recent uses of the term “Quasi-State” have not always been correct:
according to Kolstø “sometimes the term is taken to mean recognized states that
fail[ed] to develop the necessary state structures to function as [a] fully fledged,
‘real’ states.” 112 These are called “failed states.”113 Inversely, entities which did
not acquire international recognition despite factually controlling their territories
are called “Quasi-States.”114

111
See Pål Kolstø, The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States, 43 J. PEACE RES. 723,
726 (2006) (discussing several prominent examples of post-World War II conflicts involving quasi-states).
112
Id. at 723.
113
Id.
114
Lee, supra note 13, at 25.
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Scholars have adopted different positions when answering the question of
Quasi-statehood. For instance, international law scholar Pål Kolstø lists three
criteria for Quasi- statehood: First, the entity must be in control of most of the
territory it lays claim to. Second, it must have pursued statehood but failed to
acquire international recognition as a State. Third it should have persisted in
such status of non-recognition for more than two years.115 Kolstø argues that
through stipulating the third requirement, the whole category of entities with
political instability will be eliminated.116
Dutch writer Alexander G. Wills rejects Kolstø’s second requirement,
viewing it as too restrictive since it unnecessarily ignores state-like entities
which condemn their subjection to foreign authority but do not necessarily claim
statehood, such as Taiwan.117 Accordingly, Wills only retains the requirement
of rejecting foreign authority.118 He argues that this criterion allows for a
distinction between entities, which, on the one hand, actively assert their
independence (e.g., Abkhazia, Somaliland, and Transnistria), and, on the other,
do not (e.g. Hong Kong and Puntland).119 Thus, it is clear that the common
denominator for both authors is the rejection of foreign authority.
In the context of the crime of aggression, which aims at elevating
international peace to a higher level, it will be more convenient to consider
Wills’ standpoint which expands the circle of potential Quasi-States. Wills
replaced Kolstø’s third criterion of excluding entities that persisted in a state of
non-recognition for fewer than two years with the requirement of stable or
peaceful existence.120 As such, Wills and Kolstø agree on the same requirements
to a certain degree regarding permanence or viability, but they disagree on the
significance of the time element.
Again, Wills’ perspective would be a better choice for achieving wider
international peace and security, as it includes several Quasi-States that would
be arbitrarily excluded if we were to apply Kolstø’s two-year criteria for stability
and viability. Finally, in addition to Kolstø’s requirement of international denial
of recognition to the entity’s claim of statehood,121 Wills requires a Quasi-State’s
statehood to be either “disputed or it is generally understood to be something
115
Id. at 725–26. It is to be noted, however, that Kolstø developed this list for the purpose of examining
the sustainability and future of unrecognised Quasi-States, and not for the purpose of aggression.
116
Id. at 726.
117
Wills, supra note 8, at 85.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Kolstø, supra note 111, at 726.
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other than a state”.122 This requirement is the essential factor that differentiates
Quasi-States from fully-fledged States. Hence, it is evident that there is no clear
demarcation of what constitutes a Q-State, yet these criteria might help outline
the concept of a Q-State. Quasi-States would normally possess some basic
attributes, such as the exercise of control over a certain territory and the
maintenance of a peaceful and/or viable existence. Further differentiating QuasiStates from fully recognized states is a degree of uncertainty concerning the
entity’s statehood either because it was disputed or largely denied by the
international community.
Alternatively, it might be helpful to emphasise what Quasi-States are not.
Quasi-States are neither disputed border territories like Ogaden123 nor separatist
movements, like in Quebec or in Catalonia which aim for sovereignty and
independence.124 They are also not semiautonomous territories like Hong Kong,
nor are they ideological/religious extremist movements like the so called IS
within their territorial gains.
B. Evaluating Statehood for Quasi-States
Based on the above, Quasi-States share some common characteristics with
recognised States. However, there are slight differences between them, although
these should not preclude Quasi-States from the statehood description.
Nevertheless, due to the flawed nature of international law their statehood is
usually put in question.
The purpose of the following analysis125 is to: (a) demarcate the concept of
Quasi-States, which assists in finding the most suitable solution; (b) highlight
the difference between Quasi-States and States; (c) conclude that this variation
between Quasi-States and States does not affect in any way the statehood
statuses of these entities.
1. Traditional Criteria of Statehood
According to Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention, a State should
possess: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government;
122

Wills, supra note 8, at 86 (introducing his fourth criteria).
Conciliation Resources, History: Ogaden region, CONCILIATION RESOURCES (Sept. 1, 2016),
http://www.c-r.org/where-we-work/horn-africa/history-ogaden-region.
124
Wills, supra note 8, at 86.
125
Based on the statehood framework codified under Article I of the Montevideo Convention on Rights
and Duties of States. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (6th ed. 2008); JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 45–46 (2d ed. 2006).
123
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and (d) the capacity to enter into agreements with other States.126 Moreover, in
the opinion of the Arbitration Commission of the European Conference on
Yugoslavia, a state is defined as “a community which consists of a territory and
a population subject to an organised political authority . . . [and] is characterised
by sovereignty”. 127
It is therefore clear that the concept of statehood revolves around territorial
effectiveness. However, this provision under Article 1 of the Montevideo
Convention did not offer an exhaustive list of the necessary criteria for acquiring
statehood,128 yet other factors, such as recognition and self-determination, might
be relevant as well.129
In relation to the requirement of a permanent population,130 it is not explicitly
known what qualifies as a sufficient population. In fact, the issue of acceptable
minimum population was a key question in the Falkland Islands conflict.131
Resolving this matter might give good guidance as to the required minimum to
fulfil the first criterion of statehood.
The second criterion of statehood is having a defined territory,132 which
focuses on determining a particular territory upon which the state should operate
and not on settling or having a strictly defined territory.133 Hence, there are some
unrecognised states that are involved in disputes related to border demarcations,
even though their statehood is not directly affected.134 For example, Israel had
multiple border disputes with its Arab neighbors both before and after the
international community recognized its statehood, thus indicating an operational
focus in satisfying this criterion rather than a strictly geographical one.135
The third criterion of statehood is the existence of some form of central
control or a government, which is vital for an effective political society.136 The

126
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 26, 1933,
165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
127
Matthew C. R. Craven, The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L Law 333, 358 (1995), http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/2572/1/Badinter%20Commission.pdf (last visited Sep. 10,
2016).
128
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 198 (6th ed. 2014).
129
Id.
130
Montevideo Convention, supra note 125, art. 1.
131
SHAW, supra note 128, at 186.
132
Montevideo Convention, supra note 125, art. 1.
133
SHAW, supra note 128, at 145.
134
Id.
135
BROWNLIE, supra note 125, at 71.
136
Montevideo Convention, supra note 126, art. 1.
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recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the UNGA in 1992137 took place in
May 2002 after a whole month of open hostilities between governmental central
forces and Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces along ethnic conflict lines. The fact
that the central government had already lost control over a substantial part of
their territories (over so-called Serb Autonomous Regions) was a clear negation
of that requirement. This and the ill-advised decision of the European
Community (EC), the predecessor of the European Union, to urge Bosnia and
Herzegovina to apply for recognition as a sovereign state outside the former
Yugoslav Republic in December 1991 might have led directly to the ensuing
hostilities and eventually the Bosnian genocide.138
In such a case, it can be said that the lack of effective control was balanced
by considerable international recognition.139 Therefore, the rule of maintaining
effective control as a requirement for statehood may not be absolute, and some
exceptions may apply in cases where there is some international consensus. It
seems as if the non-binding “principle of self-determination will today be set
against the concept of effective government,” a view which does not take into
account the overriding U.N. Charter principle of state sovereignty and noninterference as enshrined in Art. 2(1) and Art. 2(7) of U.N. Charter.140
In application, some Quasi-States have maintained effective governments
(e.g., Somaliland, Northern Cyprus, and Palestine prior to 2012 when 138
member states of the General Assembly voted in favour of upgrading the
Palestinian Authority’s “observer status at the United Nations to “non-member
state”)141 while others have not established effective control (in terms of Article
1 of the Montevideo Convention) over their territory. Thus, their classification
as States will be questioned, unless supported by universal recognition or a claim
to self-determination—in which case, both situations can balance the
requirement of possessing an effective government.
The last criterion for statehood under Montevideo is the capacity to enter
into relations with other states.142 Independence, which in this regard refers to
“the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other [s]tate, the functions
137

G.A. Res. 46/237, Admission of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (July 20, 1992).
Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising from the
Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1488 (1992).
139
SHAW, supra note 128, at 145.
140
BROWNLIE, supra note 125, at 71; see G.A. Res. 50/172 (Feb. 27, 1996).
141
Palestinians win implicit U.N. recognition of sovereign state, REUTERS WORLD NEWS, (Nov. 29, 2012),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-statehood/palestinians-win-implicit-u-n-recognition-ofsovereign-state-idUSBRE8AR0EG20121129.
142
See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 128, at 202–04.
138
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of a [s]tate,”143 is the foundation of such capacity.144 It could be formal, in the
sense that the state enjoys exclusive internal and external sovereignty,145 or
actual, which according to international scholar James Crawford is “the
minimum degree of real governmental power at the disposal of the putative state
that is necessary for it to qualify as independent.”146
Arguably, a degree of actual, as well as formal independence may be
necessary for statehood.147 As Crawford puts forth, even when it is obvious that
formal independence exists, it is necessary to further investigate the actual or
effective independence of the putative state.148 It should be mentioned that actual
independence is relative in that it is a matter of degree.149 Nowadays, many
Quasi-States have weak political structures, frail defense capabilities and poor
economies and are thus often sustained by support from external patrons.150
Kosovo is supported by NATO, and the U.S. provided emergency aid to
Southern Sudan before it gained formal independence in 2011.151 However, if
the degree of external control is proven to be substantial to the extent that the
Quasi-State could be described as a puppet state, then it lacks real independence
and can be called neither a state nor a Quasi-State.152 As for the meaning of
“substantial,” scholars have emphasized that “the question is that of foreign
control overbearing the decision-making of the entity concerned on a wide range
of matters of high policy and doing so systematically and on a permanent
basis.”153
An example of the complexities that such a process may encounter appeared
in the Lithuanian unilateral declaration of independence on March 11, 1990.
This declaration was unanimously refused by the international community,
despite being issued during a period of increasing disintegration within the
Soviet Union.154 It was premature to talk about Lithuanian independence at a
time where the Soviets were maintaining considerable control within that
authority.

143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 829, 838 (1928).
Wills, supra note 8, at 89.
CRAWFORD, supra note 125, at 67.
Id. at 72.
SHAW, supra note 128, at 147.
CRAWFORD, supra note 124, at 72.
Id.
Kolstø, supra note 113, 728–33.
Wills, supra note 8, at 90.
CRAWFORD, supra note 125, at 74–76.
BROWNLIE, supra note 125, at 72.
SHAW, supra note 128, at 182.

BACHMANNABDELKADER_PROOFS

112

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

12/17/2018 12:27 PM

[Vol. 33

In conclusion, the authors submit the following definition of a Quasi-State:
an entity having a modest permanent population and a defined territory, even if
its borders are disputed while exercising effective governmental control over
that same territory. The latter requirement can be balanced with wide universal
recognition or a claim to self-determination, whereby a lower degree of
governmental control could be acceptable. This entity must also enjoy a degree
of independence, otherwise substantial external control can preclude it from
acquiring statehood.
Therefore, it is submitted that Quasi-States are similar to fully-fledged states
in the sense that they fulfil the criteria of statehood as set in the Montevideo
Convention in a strictly technical sense.155 Where they differ from states is in
the degree of fulfilment of the criteria. It should be noted in this context that if a
fully-fledged state suddenly does not fulfil one of the criteria for statehood, like
effective control for example, it does not become a Quasi-State but rather a
“failed state.”
In this regard, the difficulty of reaching the correct legal description for
Quasi-States stems from their varied degrees of fulfilment of the criteria, which
may or may not qualify them for statehood. This process is very complex, as
shall be seen in the forthcoming part, as those who have the duty to carry this
process out will usually be reluctant in doing so, particularly, when concluding
on the existence of an effective government and on independence.156 Further,
due to the existence of issues such as the definition of territories and permanent
population, which are not given much attention, it will be hard to uphold a clearcut distinction between Quasi-Statehood and traditional statehood.157
Nevertheless, in some other instances, the entity may fully attain all the
required criteria for statehood, yet not be universally recognized as a state. For
example, Somaliland has a population of over three and a half million settled
over a territory covering around 137,600 km2.158 It is also led by a government
situated in Hargeisa with de facto control over the territory since 1991,159 but it
has yet to be accepted as a state within the international community. Thus, it is
crucial to study the effect of non- recognition on such entities.
155

See Montevideo Convention, supra note 126, art. 1.
OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, SUMMARY OF PRACTICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS DEPOSITARY OF
MULTILATERAL TREATIES 23 (1999).
157
BROWNLIE, supra note 125, at 70.
158
Allison K. Eggers, When is a State a State – The Case for Recognition of Somaliland, 30 B.C. INT’L
COMP. L. REV. 211, 213 (2007).
159
Hussein M. Adam, Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea, 21
REV. AFR. POL. ECON., 21, 21–22 (1994).
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It is also important to consider whether the attainment of the criteria for
statehood in an unlawful way, like in the case of Taiwan, impairs claims for
statehood.160 Before looking at the effect of those additional factors on the issue
of statehood in international law, the following section will examine whether the
lack of recognition of Quasi-States could impair their statehood; if recognition
serves as an essential requirement for statehood, then a Quasi-State would not
qualify as a state under any circumstances.
2. The Effect of Non-Recognition and the Development of Statehood Among
Quasi-States
Recognition is a means of acknowledging a certain factual situation and
granting it legal significance.161 Somewhat ironically, one of the major functions
of official recognition has more to do with the recognizing State rather than the
newly recognized State; namely, the recognition itself is a reflection of the
official position of the recognizing State (in that it recognizes that the newly
recognized State has fulfilled certain criteria that qualify it for statehood.162 By
contrast, non-recognition conveys the idea that the particular entity did not attain
the required degree of independence and control entitling it to be identified as a
state.163 It is also to be mentioned that recognition in this sense is merely
indicative of the recognizing States’ individual positions vis-à-vis any newly
recognized state, and such recognition has no binding effect on other states.164 It
is solely pointing to the position states might have in the matter of helping new
entities be regarded as an international subject.
In the context of developing statehood, recognition may be perceived as
constitutive or declaratory.165 According to the former theory, a state cannot
come into being without recognition even if it fulfils all other required criteria
for statehood,166 while the latter maintains that recognition is more of a political
rather than legal act. Therefore, a new state emerges once it satisfies the
prerequisites of a state even if it is not recognized.
The modern tendency in international law is towards supporting the
declaratory approach,167 which is due to the contradiction of the constitutive
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

CRAWFORD, supra note 125, at 133.
SHAW, supra note 128, at 185.
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 74 (2d ed., Oxford University Press 2005).
Id.
Id.
CRAWFORD, supra note 125, at 93.
J.D. Van der Vyver, Statehood in International Law, 5 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 9, 16 (1991).
SHAW, supra note 128, at 185, 390.
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theory with the principle of effectiveness, whereby effective status quo is fully
legitimized by international law.168 Moreover, this theory may even be in
conflict with the U.N. principle of the sovereign equality of states, as it grants
the existing states unjustified authority to decide when a new entity which
exhibits all requirements of a state to the international community can be
admitted.169
Finally, this theory will ultimately result in inconsistency in international
relations since a certain entity will be perceived as a state with regard to the
states which recognized it while at the same time lacking legal personality as far
as other states are concerned.170 This does not mean that the declaratory theory
is free from criticism. According to this theory, the concept of the state is
regarded as a mere matter of fact. Yet despite this objective posturing,
declaratory theory fails to justify the existence of some states despite lacking
factual prerequisites for statehood.171 For example, Guinea-Bissau, Congo, and
Ethiopia achieved universal recognition as states without having either
independent or effective governments.172
Recognition is usually affected by international politics as it evolves
gradually, especially, in cases where the new entity is born out of the wounds of
prior political and military struggle with the parent state. Due to political
considerations, a fragment of the international community may hold aloof, thus,
extending the period during which recognition is granted.173 In conclusion, both
theories do not adequately justify the factual existence of de facto states or the
practical function of recognition as a tool for granting admission to
institutions.174
Despite the inadequacy of both theories, it is clear that recognition cannot
vitiate the statehood of a Quasi-State with effective sovereignty. However, this
is not always the case as non-recognition has various reasons with distinct legal
effects, whether it is due to political reasons or serious doubts about the
statehood status of an entity, or even if states are under a duty not to recognize
unlawful situations.175
168

CASSESE, supra note 162, at 74.
William T. Worster, Law, Politics, and the Conception of the State in State Recognition Theory, 27
B.U. INT’L REV. 115, 120 (2009).
170
CASSESE, supra note 162, at 74.
171
CRAWFORD, supra note 125, at 3.
172
Id. at 128.
173
CASSESE, supra note 162, at 76.
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CRAWFORD, supra note 124, at 5.
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Unlike for political reasons, non-recognition due to serious doubts about the
entity’s statehood should be carefully scrutinized by the deciding body, while
further analysing the degree of fulfilment of the statehood criteria. Further, nonrecognition in compliance with the international obligation of denying unlawful
situations will be examined below.
Moreover, in the context of admission to international organizations, lack of
recognition may hinder such entities from joining institutions like the ICC. For
example, the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG), when considering
whether an entity is a State for the purpose of its adhesion to a treaty, applies the
so-called “Vienna Formula.”176 According to the framework, an entity can be
considered a state for the purpose of joining the treaty if it is a member of the
U.N., specialized agencies, or even party to the Statute of the ICJ. If an entity
conforms to the scope of this formula, then the UNSG will consider it to be a
state.177 The applicability of this formula will be further examined in section C.
Accordingly, recognition can be seen as the second distinctive factor between
Quasi-States and States. An entity fulfilling the elements of statehood and
having universal recognition will be designated as a fully-fledged state, while
one fulfilling Montevideo’s criteria but lacking international recognition may
qualify for Quasi-Statehood, depending on the reason behind their denied
recognition.
3. Emergence of Quasi-States Through the Illegal Use of Force
A doctrine on non-recognition has been developing since the 1930s where
the factual conditions required by many states for recognition have changed.178
In the past, exercising effective control over a population in a particular territory
was sufficient to accept a new state into the international community.179 In the
1930s, a further requirement developed, whereby the emergence of a new state
must not contradict with the fundamental morality and legality of the
international community180 (such as the illegality/prohibition of the use of war/
renunciation of war as emerging principles of international law).181 This

176
U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, SUMMARY OF PRACTICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS
DEPOSITARY OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES, at 22–23, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.94.V.15
(1999).
177
Id. at 23–25.
178
CASSESE, supra note 162, at 75; SHAW, supra note 128, at 390.
179
CASSESE, supra note 162, at 75.
180
Id. at 75; SHAW, supra note 128, at 390.
181
The growing consensus among Europe’s nations in the interwar years regarding the illegality of the use
of force (prior to the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2 (4) UN Charter in 1945) is being highlighted
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requirement was reinforced by the principle that legal rights cannot stem from
an illegal situation (ex-injuria jus non oritur).182 Crawford further articulated
that if the existence of the entity is based on a serious breach of the peremptory
norms of international law, then it is justifiable not to treat such an entity as a
state, regardless of its degree of effectiveness.183 Northern Cyprus, for example,
was established after the illegal invasion of Turkey, thus it cannot assumed to be
independent.184 There are many entities that were created as a result of the
unlawful use of force by foreign states, as is arguably the case in South Ossetia,
Kosovo and Northern Cyprus.
Three situations should hence be distinguished: when foreign intervention
takes the form of mere assistance to local insurgents; when foreign powers
intervene directly in a conflict; and when an existing Quasi-State relies on
foreign military support for its continued independence.185 When foreign
intervention goes beyond the mere provision of assistance and takes on the
character of direct military action, the unlawful use of force is central to the
existence of such an entity. Consequently, the emergence of such an entity
significantly violates the peremptory norms of international law; thus, this entity
will not be considered a state.186 On the other hand, when an independent entity
emerges from foreign occupation, then this entity can be treated as a state,
assuming it is lawfully exercising the right to self-determination.187 Between the
requirement of effectiveness—mentioned previously—and the emerging
principle of withholding legitimacy, an anomalous situation may exist.188 The
coexistence of these two principles may give rise to an ambiguous result by
which an entity may meet all the requirements for statehood but nevertheless is
deprived of international intercourse.189 This is due to the principle of
withholding legitimacy’s inability to displace its predecessor (the principle of
effectiveness).190

in the creation of the Kellogg Briand Pact (General Treato on the Renunciation of War) of 1928 supra note 87
and the above discussed attempts to ban the use of force in international relations.
182
SHAW, supra note 128, at 390.
183
CRAWFORD, supra note 125, at 158.
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See generally, e.g., Suzanne Palmer, The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus: Should the United
States Recognize it as an Independent State, 4 B.U. INT’L L.J. 423 (1986).
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Id. at 127–28.
188
CASSESE, supra note 162, at 76.
189
Id.
190
Id.

BACHMANNABDELKADER_PROOFS

2018]

12/17/2018 12:27 PM

THE ICC STATUTE

117

III. QUASI-STATES AND THE ICC
The following part will critically examine the ICC’s interpretation of
statehood and underline the uncertainties surrounding the organization’s
position towards Quasi-States. This will most probably exclude Quasi-States
from the ICC’s jurisdiction, which is not only legally and historically unjustified
but also practically undesirable for its effect on the functioning and efficiency
of the international criminal justice system. Hence, this further emphasises the
need to explicitly include Quasi-States under the definition of the crime of
aggression.
A. The Palestinian Case: A Deviation of the Prosecutor’s Interpretation of
Statehood
1. Background
On January 22, 2009, Ali Khashan, in his capacity as Minister of Justice,
representing the Palestinian Fatah government (Palestinian Authority), made a
declaration accepting the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction over Palestinian
territory dating back to July 1, 2002.191 Three years later, the ICC’s Prosecutor
issued a decision rejecting the Palestinian Authority’s request to recognize the
court’s jurisdiction.192 The Prosecutor based his decision on the application of
Article 12 of the Rome Statute, which stipulates that only states can “confer”
jurisdiction upon the Court.193
In his decision, Prosecutor Ocampo argued that it was the UNSG that is
responsible for determining the term “state.”194 However, he did not refer the
matter to the UNSG, rather he decided on the matter by applying what he thought
the UNSG would have decided.195 He added that, in case of controversy
concerning whether an applicant constitutes a “state” or not “it is the practice of
the Secretary-General to follow or seek the General Assembly’s directives on
the matter.”196 Accordingly, the Prosecutor analyzed the question of interpreting

191
PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, DECLARATION RECOGNIZING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/74EEE201-0FED-448195D4-C8071087102C/279777/20090122PalestinianDeclaration2.pdf
192
Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Palestine, International Criminal Court, ¶ 6 (Apr. 3, 2012),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9B651B80-EC43-4945-BF5A-FAFF5F334B92/284387/
SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf.
193
See id. ¶ 4.
194
See id. ¶ 5.
195
See id.
196
Id.
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Palestinian statehood as follows: the UNGA during that period of time granted
the Palestinian Liberation Organization “observer” status only, and not “nonmember state” status, so the Prosecutor concluded that Palestine was not a state,
hence not entitled to recognize the Court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the absence
of recognition by the UNGA was treated as a hindrance to acquiring
statehood.197 If the UNSG’s methodology when considering statehood is
examined, it will show that it depends on the Vienna Formula.198 In other words,
if an entity is a member of the U.N. or its specialized agencies, or Party to the
Statute of the ICJ then it will be considered a state for the purpose of admission
to a treaty.199
In practice, UNSG recognized statehood for the Cook Islands and Niue on
the grounds that both of them were admitted to the World Health Organization
(WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), regardless of the fact that both lacked a UNGA
resolution recognizing their statehood.200 Applying the same framework to the
Palestinian case, the Prosecutor should have accepted Palestine’s declaration
based on its admission to UNESCO, which occurred one year prior to his
decision.201 However, contrary to what the Prosecutor claimed about following
UNSG practice, which would have accepted Palestine’s declaration, he devised
his own interpretation of the term “state.” In fact, while UNSG adopted a wider
interpretation of the term “state,” the Prosecutor embraced a narrower one. As
proof of the ICC’s insistence on its wrongful position, a few months after the
refusal of the Palestinian declaration, the UNGA voted to recognize Palestine as
a “state.”202 Consequently, Prosecutor Bensouda emphasized that “Palestine
would be able to accept the jurisdiction of the [ICC] from 29 November 2012
onward.”203 Therefore, the Prosecutor considered that Palestine had gained
statehood on that day, which is in itself contrary to the UNSG practice to
consider Palestine a state from the date it was admitted to the UNESCO in 2011.
In this sense, the Prosecutor’s standpoint towards recognition, as a precondition
197

See id. ¶ 7.
See U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, SUMMARY OF PRACTICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS
DEPOSITARY OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES, at 22–23, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.94.V.15
(1994).
199
See id.
200
See id. at 24.
201
Palestine, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. AND CULTURAL ORG. (UNESCO), http://en.unesco.org/
countries/palestine (last visited Sept. 1, 2016) (discussing Palestine joining UNESCO on November 23, 2011).
202
G.A. Res. 67/19, at 3 (Dec. 4, 2012).
203
Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou
Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Palestine, ICC Press Release ICC-OTP20150116-PR1083 (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1083.
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for statehood, deviated from the agreed upon practice regarding the role of
recognition as previously articulated. Moreover, even when the Prosecutor
considered recognition as a prerequisite for statehood, he disregarded the Vienna
Formula and only accepted recognition from the UNGA as evidence for the
entity’s statehood.
2. The Uncertain Position of Quasi-States under the Crime of Aggression
Resulting from the Prosecutor’s Interpretation of the Term “State”
The term “State” was mentioned in four different places within the Rome
Statute: (a) a state that could accede to the Court;204 (b) a non-party state which
is willing to accept the ad-hoc jurisdiction of the Court through a declaration;205
(c) a state that through its wrongful policy supports the commission of crimes
against humanity and/or genocide;206 and (d) a state in the context of war crimes
and the crimes of aggression.207 From the aforementioned practices of the ICC’s
Prosecutors, it is clear that the term “State” in the first and second contexts refers
to the State which is recognized by the UNGA. Looking at the fourth instance,
which is more relevant to the topic of this Article, it is important to account for
the interpretation of the term “State” that could be adopted by the Prosecutor,
and its respective legal implications on the scope and applicability of the crime
of aggression. The possible interpretation of statehood for the purpose of
aggression that could be adopted is as articulated above; to include recognition
by UNGA as an essential prerequisite for statehood. However, upon closer
examination of the historical evolution of the crime, it can be inferred that
recognition is not necessary for determining statehood for the purpose of
aggression. For example, during the Korean war in 1950, the UNGA considered
the attack of North Korea on South Korea as an example of aggression,208 despite
the status of North Korea at the time which was still in statu nascendi.209
Furthermore, an explanatory note annexed to the definition of “aggression” was
included in UNGA Resolution 3314 (XXIX) to clarify that “the term ‘[s]tate’ . .
. [i]s used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is
a member of the [U.N.] . . . .”210 As mentioned previously, this Resolution was
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See Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 125–26.
See id. art. 87(a)–(b).
See id. art. 7(2)(a).
See id. art. 8(2)(f); see A.S.P. Res.RC/Res.6, supra note 3, art. 8bis (June 11, 2010).
Michael Walzer, The Crime of Aggressive War, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 635, 635 (2007).
See G.A. Res. 376 (V), at 9 (Oct. 7, 1950); see S.C. Res. 82, ¶ 2 (June 25, 1950).
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later used as the basis for defining an “act of aggression” under the Rome
Statute.211
Hence, the normal understanding of the term “State” for the purpose of the
crime of aggression shows that recognition is not a precondition for statehood.
As such, the interpretation of the term “State” adopted by the Prosecutor in the
Palestinian case, is different than that applied in the context of aggression. As a
result, this may lead to some peculiar situations whereby the nature of the crime
covers armed conflicts involving Quasi-States. Nevertheless, the ICC would
eliminate them until they receive recognition from the UNGA. The other odd
situation would be extending statehood status for an entity which is not entitled
to accept the ICC’s jurisdiction. This second situation represents a serious breach
of the international law principle of sovereign equality, as an entity would be
granted statehood status with the international obligation attached to it, while at
the same time, being precluded from the rights assigned to this status; such as
joining international institutions like the ICC.
B. The Practical Necessity of Including Quasi-States under the Scope of the
Crime of Aggression
In 1947, there were ten ongoing civil wars in contrast to only two interstate
wars.212 De-colonialization and the subsequent establishment of new states postindependence as well as the end of the Cold War in 1991 led to a multiplication
of such internal wars. Most of these new states encountered violent challenges
of their state capacity and legitimacy,213 and thus, internal wars were the
prevalent form of warfare during the 1980ies and early 1990s.214 This is
highlighted by the observation that, while the number of international wars never
exceeded six per year, the aggregate of internal conflicts reached fifty-two in
1992.215 This rough augmentation in the second half of the twentieth century
was a normal outcome of the struggle for viability on behalf of new states
emerging out of colonial systems.216 Given the continuous radical
transformation in the type of armed conflicts, it would be irrational not to revisit
the exclusion of Quasi-States from the scope of the crime of aggression.
Although there has been increasing armed conflicts involving Quasi-States,217

211
212
213
214
215
216
217

A.S.P. Res. RC/Res.6, supra note 3, art. 8 bis(2), at 18 (June 11, 2010).
Rep. of the Rep. of the High-Level Panel, supra note 12, at 17.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16.
See Wills, supra note 8, at 83–84.
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the new Kampala amendments failed to guarantee their inclusion under the
ambit of the crime of aggression.
The importance of explicitly incorporating Quasi-States under the Rome
Statute stems from the need to pursue the broad objectives of international
criminal justice and public international law. Originally, the initiative of
defining the crime of aggression was motivated by the necessity to address the
contemporary threats to international peace and security.218 Criminalizing
aggression aims at protecting four major interests: (a) stability; (b) security; (c)
human rights; and (d) sovereignty.219 As a result of inter-state and intra-state
aggression since the end of the twentieth century, more than a billion individuals
now lack access to clean water, more than two billion are denied adequate
sanitation, and more than three million die every year from water-related
diseases.220 In addition, globally, 821 million people faced hunger in 2017221 and
over 35 million people are living with HIV according to estimates by the World
Health Organization. 222 Many of those issues arose not only from international
but also internal conflicts and contribute significantly to the modern challenges
of globalization in terms of poverty, the lack of access to food, water and health
care. It is now time for the international community to take a stance and consider
Quasi-States as key participants in modern aggression.223 Some might argue that
Quasi-States can be prosecuted for crimes against humanity or genocide, all of
which are individual crimes without necessarily involving states. However, this
does not guarantee the utmost degree of international peace and security.
According to the Nuremberg tribunal’s judgment, “War is essentially an evil
thing . . . . To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international
crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes
in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”224 This is true
as defining the act of aggression under the Rome Statute places the waging of
military action within the purview of the law.225 Besides, aggression is a crime

218

Michael Anderson, Reconceptualizing Aggression, 60 DUKE L.J. 411, 420 (2010).
Drumbl, supra note 44, at 306; see LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 4
(Cambridge University Press 2008).
220
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., Water, sanitation and hygiene links to health, http://who.int/water_
sanitation_health/publications/facts2004/en/ (last visited Nov. 2014).
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See FAO, Food Security & Nutrition around the World, http://www.fao.org/state-of-food-securitynutrition/en/ (last visited Sept. 2018).
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http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.22100WHO?lang=en (last updated July 11, 2018).
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See Anderson, supra note 218, at 420.
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of jus ad bellum, while the other crimes relate to jus in bello.226 This means that
aggression relates to the initiation of armed conflict, whereas war crimes are
sanctions on violations during the execution of the war.227 Thus, aggression can
be seen as the main door for all other international crimes, which might help in
deterring future atrocities, as military leaders will fear using force as it might
then endanger them personally.228
Solving the issue of whether the crime of aggression is applicable to conflicts
involving Quasi-States is of major importance. Quasi-States exist throughout
Africa, Europe and Asia;229 nearly all of them came into existence by military
means through civil war against their mother state,230 and are a major source of
war.231 Accordingly, nowadays, the structure of warfare is shifting towards a
more decentralized form, the state remains an important actor, yet, not the
dominant contributor.232 Not extending the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction over
aggression from or against Quasi-States is an indefinite guarantee of continuous
impunity. It delivers the message “that international aggression is not
blameworthy,”233 and Benjamin Ferencz (the renowned former U.S. prosecutor
for the Nuremberg tribunal) stresses the failure to prosecute aggression is a step
backwards and a repudiation of Nuremberg.234
IV. A WIDER INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM “STATE”
Many scholars recognize the incompatibility of the current state-centric
structure adopted by the ICC with the current sociological changes in the form
of warfare. However, the disagreement revolves around the methodology used
in resolving this issue.235 The first group of scholars is in favor of adopting a
wider interpretation of the term “state,” yet they disagree on the extent to which

226
Frederic Megret, International Criminal Law 12 (Dec. 28, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1321253&rec=1&srcabs=1006089&alg=1&pos=4; see Yoram Dinstein, Panel II Discussion—
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See id.
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Id. at 732.
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See Wills, supra note 8, at 86–87 (discussing the Sri Lankan Civil War, the second Sudanese Civil War
South Ossetia War and certain stages of the Yugoslav Wars as recent examples of armed conflicts involving
Quasi-States).
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the meaning should be broadened; some support limiting it to the exclusive
inclusion of Quasi-States,236 while others argue that the term “state” could
encompass most non-state actors.237 In parallel, the other group of scholars is
calling for the amendment of the Rome Statute to explicitly mention the term
“Non-State Actors” (NSA).238 This part will explain why the interpretative
approach, adopted by the first group, is not favoured, and the following part will
discuss the possible amendments of the Rome statue to solely include QuasiStates and not NSAs.
Professor Weisbord, an independent expert delegate to the Special Working
Group on the Crime of Aggression, is amongst the scholars who criticised such
state-centrism. He proposed instead the adoption of a wider interpretation of the
term “State” as solution to include NSAs.239 He argues that so long as NSAs
possess state-like characteristics, it would be best to include them under the
“State” category.240 Since, the ASP had already reached widespread acceptance
on the current formulation of the crime of aggression, this methodology would
be beneficial in avoiding taking any other steps towards amending that
definition. Thus, Weisbord’s approach provides enough flexibility for the
definition to be compatible with the current international situation while also
being helpful in preserving its original state-centrism.241 If Weisbord’s argument
is true and the word “State” could include NSAs, then incorporating only QuasiStates would, by default, be highly difficult. It would in turn increase the
technical hitches in the ICC’s work, as well as jeopardize the efficiency of the
international criminal justice system. If this proves to be correct, then it would
support the argument of this Article to explicitly include Quasi-States under the
definition of the crime aggression alongside “States,” albeit under a different
bracket.
A. Applicability of Montevideo’s Conception of Statehood on Terrorist held
Territories and Groups
To answer this question one must consider and then apply the four criteria
required for statehood to the prevalent general characteristics of terrorist groups.
When those terrorist groups, as one type of NSA, exercise de facto control over
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an otherwise illegally held territory, they could theoretically attain statehood
under the Rome Statute.
Firstly and with regard to the requirement of permanent population, a
specific condition that will be relevant to terrorist groups would be that an
entity’s population must inhabit some territory over which the NSA would have
to have exclusive (quasi-governmental) control.242 In practice, due to these
NSAs’ illegal and often covert existence, their members or affiliated population
maintain secrecy and inhabit remote places such as mountains to evade
capture.243 This was the case, for example, with the Taliban post-Operation Iraqi
Freedom,244 Al Qaeda, 245 and the various terrorist groups in the Sinai desert in
Egypt.246 However, nowadays, the nature of terrorist groups has evolved and
those groups have started inhabiting certain territories with more or less
permanent populations. For example, at the height of its reign in 2016, IS
controlled 68,300 square kilometers of territory, inhabited by their affiliates as
well as indigenous people.247 Hence, with the continuous development in the
nature and significance of terrorist group activities, it is likely to see them
fulfilling this condition in the near future.
Closely related to the first requirement is the necessity of having a defined
territory.248 Based on the above, with the exception of IS, the rest of the
examples cannot fulfil the territorial requirement. Professor Philip B. Heymann
writes that a “condition of [the] organizational existence” of independent
terrorist groups, is “a sheltering country such as Syria, Iraq, or Iran.”249 Thus,
these groups operate on the territory of other states, without having a territory of
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their own.250 Nowadays, however, with the increasing number of failed states,
terrorist groups are able to conquer more territories and attain the second
requirement of statehood. For instance, within Syria there are various terrorist
groups with their own distinctive territories.251 Moreover, the Houthi group in
Yemen has conquered and continues to hold parts of the territory where most of
the population lives252 and the Libya Dawn Militia Alliance have also taken over
nearly half of the Libyan territory.253 Nevertheless, even if these groups are able
to fulfill the aforementioned criteria, still, they cannot qualify as states without
exercising full governmental control over their territory. The requirement of full
governmental control is central for statehood as all the other conditions revolve
around it.254 International law does not provide any specific form, nature, or
extent for this control, but it does express that a state government should provide
at least some degree of law and order and establish essential institutions.255
Terrorist organizations in most cases disregard these objectives.256 They are “led
by individuals who . . . display an utter disregard for both human life and the
rule of law.”257 Accordingly, terrorist group held territories, lacking this
requirement, will certainly not qualify for statehood.258
Finally, given the factors mentioned above which stand against
independence for terrorist groups, it would be hard to assume that they could
achieve the fourth criterion of Montevideo: to enter into relations with other
states. Furthermore, since it is very clear that the violation of international norms
is very prominent and central to their emergence, it is of international duty not
to recognize them, which impedes such group-held territories from achieving
statehood in such a way.
In conclusion, it is impossible for such NSA-held territory to fulfill the
widely accepted criteria of statehood, even if nowadays we can see some
terrorist groups with a permanent population and defined territory. They are still,
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however, far from attaining governmental control and capacity in order to enter
into relations with other states, which is pivotal for statehood. Thus, most
terrorist groups cannot be described as states under the Montevideo convention.
B. The Dynamic Conception of Statehood and Terrorist Groups
The fact that Montevideo’s criteria for statehood represents customary law
and the most widely accepted benchmarks of statehood is undisputed. Therefore,
the term “State” should be interpreted in light of these criteria. However, this
area of law is remarkably complex.259 Most scholars have opted for
deemphasizing some of its criteria while attaching new ones, rather than opting
for a complete replacement of the convention.260 Nonetheless, the well-known
military historian Philip Bobbitt introduced a new conception for “States” which
totally deviates from Montevideo’s.261 He argues that the concept of a state is
now about to witness a seismic change.262 He emphasized that, today, the
prevalent constitutional order is the nation state, which is based on maximizing
the welfare of its people.263 Hence, it must ensure national security and safeguard
its society from transnational hazards.264 Nevertheless, in the past decade, there
has been a shift from one constitutional order to another—from the nation state
to the “Market State,” due to challenges that the nation state cannot overcome.265
For instance, the globalisation of markets reduced the ability of the State to
manage its currency and its own economy. It also motivated rapid economic
growth that lead to some transnational consequences such as climate change and
inequality, thus undermining the legitimacy of the nation state due to its inability
to provide continuous improvements to the material wellbeing of its citizens.266
In defence of its legitimacy, the nation state will make use of private enterprises
and nongovernmental organisations to supplement traditional governmental
operations,267 and deregulate industries to establish more dynamic and fruitful
markets.268 As Bobbitt observed, in 2005, American private policy was
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privatised to a great extent, and public-private partnership projects were evident
by the presence of approximately 50,000 private contractors—during the U.S.
invasion to Iraq—performing functions that used to be carried out by a principal
administrative division of the military.269 Therefore, the present constitutional
order is gradually decaying and being replaced by a new one.270 This new form,
the “Market State,” will be driven by market dynamics where businesses are
more involved with social and cultural responsibilities, not to secure the welfare
of the people but to maximize the opportunities available to them.271 If
opportunity maximization is the main driven factor of new statehood then it is
suitable to capture terrorist organisation under the term “State.” As Bobbitt
questions if al Qaeda could match this novel concept of statehood,272 Professor
Weisbord responds affirmatively, arguing that “Bobbitt’s dynamic conception
of the [S]tate may offer diplomats drafting the definition of the crime [of
aggression] and jurists interpreting it a way to include acts by al Qaeda-like
groups within its ambit.”273 Moreover, he explains that by using a dynamic
conception of statehood, it is possible that the definition could be expanded
beyond its literal text and applied to NSAs.274
This supposition bears a number of risks that could result in unfavorable
consequences. Despite the fact that this assumption is too narrow and would not
capture all types of terrorist groups, it could be successful in including some.
Thus, the scope of the term “State” should closely follow Montevideo
Convention, otherwise, any expansion in its interpretation bears the risk of
encompassing a number of terrorist groups, especially within the current
evolution of their nature, contexts, and types. Therefore, what are the possible
risks that can be derived from this inference?
C. Risks Attached to Granting Statehood Status to Terrorist Groups
Following the previous analysis and complexities surrounding the question
of statehood, if the ASP were to adopt a wider interpretation of the term “State”
in order to resolve the issue of Quasi-States, an exceedance of the limits of this
interpretation could occur, and a terrorist organisation could wrongly be
classified as a state. This methodology threatens the equality of states and
undermines the efforts to prosecute terrorism. Extending statehood for the
269
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purpose of prosecuting aggression may take one of these two forms: a
circumscribed extension limited to the narrower scope of prosecuting aggression
before the ICC, or, alternatively, a broader extension that would confer most, if
not all, the rights and obligations of statehood.Both cases have serious risks
attached to their application as shall be examined below. Professor Hersch
Lauterpacht stresses that the creation of a framework for exclusive use within
international criminal law risks creating a “grotesque spectacle,”275 in other
words, a legal milieu where the same entity is considered both a state and a nonstate.276 This will not only result in inconsistency in international relations, but
also undermine the principle of sovereign equality.277 Simply put, the statehood
status carries rights and obligations. However, conferring statehood on terrorist
groups for the purpose of aggression only means that they would be burdened
with obligations without having any rights, which is a clear violation of the
principle of sovereign equality.278 Pursuant to this principle, all political entities
recognised as states are equal in rights and obligations.279 What is illegal or
unjust for one state should be illegal for all other states, regardless of their
economic power, size, population number or military potentials.280 This was
enshrined as one of the founding principles on which the U.N. was
established.281 On the other hand, conferring statehood on terrorist groups—in
all contexts—is also detrimental. In fact, if terrorist organisations were to be
granted statehood then this would entitle their military leaders to sovereign
immunity, which would hinder the national and international jurisdictions from
prosecuting them in some cases, thus subverting the efforts to prosecute
terrorism.282
Even if the ICC was able to exclude terrorist groups from the adopted
interpretations, it would certainly be confronted with the same legal milieu with
regard to Quasi-States. This is particularly true in the context of the Palestinian
case as examined in the previous section, since incorporating Quasi-States under
the “States” umbrella for the purpose of aggression will result in prosecuting this
entity for aggression without conferring upon it the right to join the ICC or
accept its declaration. In addition to that, in this case, the entity would be granted
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statehood in the context of aggression, yet not be capable of joining
multinational entities inasmuch as it would have been rejected for lacking
statehood. Such inconsistency is unfavorable to the efficiency and transparency
of the international criminal system. Further, conferring statehood on QuasiStates in all contexts is practically impossible to achieve and will certainly
encounter widespread rejection from international subjects. Nonetheless,
granting these entities some rights while distinguishing them from states in
return for specific obligations is a more rational and practical solution that
corresponds to their status under international law.
In December of 2017, when the ASP revisited the definition of aggression
and considered proposed amendments it should also have considered
acknowledging Quasi-States.283 A definition of aggression which comprises the
concept of an entity not recognized as a state would have been useful but did not
materialize. As explained above, this omission will turn out to be harmful. To
establish a different status for the same entity in different settings would create
undesirable ambiguity that would negatively affect the order and stability of
international relations.284 Therefore, the ASP could have avoided this by
choosing to amend the current definition of aggression while explicitly including
Quasi-states under it.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This Article recommends an amendment to the Rome Statute to include
Quasi-States in the definition of aggression, so that the crime of aggression could
be applied to armed conflicts involving such entities. If this amendment is
accepted, the ICC could then prosecute aggressions committed between QuasiStates such as Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as the
former ratified the amendments to the crime of aggression.285 This amendment
would affect the role and powers of the UNSC as well, as the latter would then
be in a position where it could declare the use of force involving Quasi-States as
illegal under Art 2(4) of the UN Charter, and consequently find it to be an act of
aggression and accordingly, refer the situation to the ICC. At present, such
stigmatization and criminalization of the use of force against or between QuasiStates is not possible due to the controversial statehood of Quasi-States. More
283
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importantly, Quasi-States’ acts of aggression could be prosecuted under the
Rome Statute, allowing for a potentially wider scope of future prosecutions
against leaders of current day entities such as IS, Boko Haram and the Taliban.
However, even with such an amendment, the possibility that the UNSC
condemns acts of aggression committed by or against Quasi-States is unlikely:
of the estimated 313 armed conflicts that erupted between 1945 and 2008,286 the
Council only passed resolutions condemning aggression on only a handful of
occasions.287 Since Quasi-States are not members of the ICC, the effect of this
amendment in light of UNSC practice will not be far-reaching, and it is still
likely that aggression between Quasi-States and states will continue.
Political motives will always threaten the efficiency of prosecuting crimes
of aggression and will hinder the application regarding ongoing and future
aggressions. Most of the major powers (such as China, Russia, and the U.S.) are
unwilling to sign/ratify the Rome Statute, and it remains to be seen how willing
the State Parties are to accept an amendment that would increase the efficiency
of the international criminal justice system. There is no historical, legal or
practical impediment to treating Quasi-States and states equally regarding the
crime of aggression. This Article calls for legally assigning a status for
unrecognised entities on the international level. Including Quasi-States in the
crime of aggression will certainly frustrate states, particularly those facing
ongoing conflicts within its borders, and consequently they will most probably
refrain from ratifying the amendment.288 Because of the political nature of the
crime of aggression, the international community, excluding Quasi-States, spent
more than half a century trying to reach consensus on the current definition
Quasi-States. However, throughout the extensive historical debate over the
crime of aggression, it was agreed that the crime of aggression was broad enough
to include unrecognised entities. This was obvious in the SWGCA debates which
were open to member and non-member States.289 Therefore, the inclusion of
Quasi-States under the definition of crime of aggression would be possible in
the opinion of the authors. The incorporation of Quasi-States would also police
secessionist movements regarding the use of non-peaceful measures in that
process and stress the necessity of peacefulness in the context of selfdetermination. A major obstacle in the application of this amendment is the issue
of determining the status of Quasi-States. As demonstrated in the Article, the
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issue is complex and requires exhaustive examination. This issue will interplay
with numerous variables that need to be evaluated according to the
circumstances of each case. Numerous NSAs like terrorist groups are not far
from attaining Quasi-Statehood, as witnessed in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, where
terrorist groups have been in control of considerable parts of the respective
territories. In the absence of a competent authority that ought to be responsible
for deciding on the question of Quasi-Statehood, the matter will become even
more problematic. In this regard, this issue could be resolved by the UNSG
establishing a list similar to that of the non-self-governing territories.290
Law is not a static but a “living organism” that is always developing;
normative commands applicable in the past may change in the present or the
future. The objective of any legal system is to serve society, whether on the
national or international level, and the efficiency of any legal system should be
assessed in light of this objective. Service to society entails peace, security,
stability and the rule of law. The inability of the current international system to
face these ongoing challenges is striking and should be looked at more closely
and actively. The disturbance of peace and stability in one area will certainly
affect the international community in its entirety. Thus, it is of prime importance
to prosecute this core crime in situations involving Quasi-States, as this would
be one step towards maximizing what international criminal justice can achieve
in terms of contributing to global peace and security as well as prosperity.
Considering the different variables that affect the decision-making process of
global players and the historical and legal arguments that were presented
throughout the Article, we submit that the explicit inclusion of Quasi-States is
the only practical solution for an otherwise unresolved dilemma of current
international criminal justice.
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